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ABSTRACT
Since welfare reform in 1996, privatization has led to a radical
reconfiguration in the dominant mode of governance in public benefits
programs. The United States has largely moved from systems controlled
through law and regulation to systems controlled through contracts. With
this shift has come a significant diminishment in public accountability in
general and, more specifically, a diminishment in the ability of poor
communities and their advocates to intervene in the making of welfare
policy. At the same time, privatization has proven to be an extraordinarily
effective mechanism for imposing highly punitive welfare programs on poor
communities. Building upon the findings of grassroots, communitycontrolled research on the effectiveness of privatized welfare-to-work
programs, this article argues that “collaborative” or “new governance”
structures provide potentially meaningful opportunities for increasing
public accountability in privatized welfare settings. However, given the
long history and current practice of using welfare programs as a means of
subordination, these structures must be configured in a way that makes
primary and renders substantive the role of low income communities in the
new collaborative governance enterprise.
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INTRODUCTION
A few years ago, I was sitting across the table from a group of lawyers
representing the New York City welfare department. We were discussing
monitoring a settlement, negotiated after six, hard-fought years of
litigation. Like most test-case litigation, the case consumed, over the
years, enormous advocacy resources from multiple financially strapped
and woefully understaffed legal services offices. The case concerned the
means by which the department provided welfare-to-work services for
welfare recipients who wanted to go to school; the settlement contained
extensive and detailed requirements about how the interactions between
our clients and the city would proceed. As plaintiffs’ counsel, we used the
lawsuit as a tool to enhance welfare recipients’ access to education. And
more broadly, like the last decade of welfare advocates’ work, the
litigation was part of our efforts to fight against a web of mechanisms
designed to force poor women off of assistance in a continuing effort to
“end welfare as we [knew] it.” 1 The settlement was drafted as is typical
in these cases: if a class member with characteristics 1, 2 or 3 said X, the
department had to do Y unless A, B, or C were true and so on. Every
term had been carefully negotiated to increase educational access and to
afford procedural and substantive rights to class members.
During this particular conversation, the parties turned to the topic of
how to monitor the specific terms of the settlement when the terms were
to be carried out by private entities under contract to the city. When we
questioned how we could monitor the vendor’s compliance with the
settlement provisions, the city’s attorney looked across the table and said
without hesitation: “we can’t monitor them. We don’t know what they are
doing or how they are doing it. We just know about outcomes like job
placement.”
Although we worked our cumbersome way through this
problem for the purpose of that litigation, in that moment I realized that
there was an elephant in the room. The contractors, who provided
1

Clinton’s famous pledge was originally made during his 1992 presidential campaign,
R. KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNEW IT 127 (2000). and reiterated it in
his 1993 State of the Union Address. See 139 CONG. REC. H674-03 (1993).
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services to huge swaths of the plaintiff class, were motivated by terms of
their contract and the monthly contract monitoring sessions conducted by
the city and not by any of our carefully negotiated words. At best, our
effects were secondarily removed. So we had a problem.
The more I thought about this problem, the more I realized that it
centered around a fundamental mismatch between current modes of
governance in public welfare programs and the tools used by advocates in
their efforts to fight on behalf of their clients. The tools designed in
response to New Deal and post-New Deal governance structures were
becoming increasingly ineffective.
This article addresses this mismatch between the law and traditional
advocacy methods in the context of the privatization of the state’s welfare
functions. 2 Beginning with the recognition that privatization in the form
of contracting out is a significant and growing trend in welfare
administration, this article ask a series of questions:
From an
administrative law perspective, how does privatization, and specifically
the contracting out of welfare programs, affect the ability of poor
communities to participate in the formulation of welfare policy? 3
Similarly, what is the efficacy of current administrative law tools in
fostering accountability and, to the extent that those tools are not effective
at creating points of intervention in policy making for poor communities,
2

Although some academics have begun to raise this issue and some organizations
have begun to tackle this problem our collective strategy on this issue remains
underdeveloped. See infra Sections Two and Three.
3
The efficacy and wisdom of turning to private entities to administer all or part of
welfare programs in specific, and the overwhelming role of privatization in governance in
general, is subject to substantial debate and raises tremendously important questions.
While I do not address these questions, the case study and other examples in this article
support many of the concerns about this governmental strategy that others articulate. For
some important discussions of the threats of privatization see Paul Starr, The Meaning of
Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 6 (1988); Martha Minow, Public and Private
Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1246-56
(2003); Orly Lobel, Rethinking Traditional Alignments: Privatization and Participatory
Citizenship, in PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, GLOBALIZATION AND MARKETS: RETHINKING
IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY 209, 210 (2007).
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what tools might be effective?
Section One, relying on a case study of welfare privatization in New
York City, illustrates how the dominance of contracting out has radically
changed the mode of governance in public welfare programs, shifting it
from law and regulation to contracts and contract monitoring.
Privatization in this context, without any public input or initial scrutiny,
has resulted in a program that imposes highly punitive welfare policies and
fails to meet the needs of the poor for education and jobs.
Section Two examines whether either administrative law or the market
currently offers effective mechanisms for public participation in this new
form of administrative governance. The section concludes that neither the
market itself nor administrative accountability tools as currently
configured are effective at creating accountability for poor communities.
Section Three explores new collaborative governance structures.
These structures provide a fruitful conceptual basis for creating a
politically feasible and effective governance structure. However, the
history of subordination and disproportionate power that characterizes
social welfare history raises serious questions about the ability of poor
communities to participate effectively in these collaborative endeavors.
As a result, Section Three argues that we must design new mechanisms to
enable substantive community participation.
Finally, Section Four
suggests that the creation of robust, community controlled monitoring
bodies can address the accountability 4 problems of governance by
4

In this Article, the term “accountability” refers to government and their private
partners’ accountability to the public in general and poor communities in particular for
the creation and implementation of welfare policy that can positively affect their lives.
The myriad of individually-focused, non-accountability issues that arise in privatized
welfare services is not the Article’s focus. For example, this Article focuses on
structures that would facilitate government transparency and participation by communitybased organizations in a policy setting rather than on how individual welfare recipients
might challenge the actions of a private entity providing services. For discussions of
these individual rights questions, see e.g., David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized
Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 231, 279–306 (1998); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal
Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569 (2001).
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contract.

I. Case Study: Welfare Reform and Privatization in New York City
A. The National Context: A Move Toward Privatization
The privatization of the United States public assistance provision
system through contracting 5 has accelerated dramatically in the last ten
years. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (hereinafter “PRA”) eliminated Aid to Families With
Dependent Children (hereinafter “AFDC”) and its guarantee of minimal
subsistence and created Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(hereinafter “TANF”) in its stead. Importantly, the PRA joined a rising
tide of initiatives to “reinvent government” by using private sector tools
and entities to free government from the constraints of what is seen as
excessive bureaucracy and constrictive civil service rules. 6 Throughout
the country, state and local jurisdictions have turned to the private sector
to respond to the challenges posed by the PRA. 7 In the welfare-to-work
5

The term “privatization” covers a broad range of mechanisms, including the
complete divestiture of assets by the government, deregulation, the use of vouchers paid
for by the government to buy particular commodities in the private market, and
contracting between the government and private entities, as well as other measures. Jack
M. Beerman, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507,
1519 (2001) (citing Ronald Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law and Theory, 71 MARQ. L.
REV. 449, 449 (1988)). See also JOEL HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY 6–7
(1996). This article addresses only privatization through contracting between
administrative agencies and private entities.
6
See, e.g., Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules,
Discretion and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121 (2000) (describing
the prominent role of the private sector and private sector management techniques in the
administration of welfare programs after 1996 and arguing that these changes are
decreasing opportunities to hold government accountable).
7
Note that this Article is not designed to add to the very important ongoing debate
about the extent to which such services should be subject to privatization. Instead I start
by assuming that, to the extent that privatization is in fact driving social welfare policy
and implementation, communities and the lawyers that work with them need new tools to
hold government accountable for how it treats some of its most vulnerable members. For
a good general introduction to the legal issues involved in privatization, see Symposium,
Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (2003); Symposium,
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area, privatization has been a major tool in a very effective campaign to
significantly reduce the welfare rolls. Today, the full range of services,
from eligibility determinations to welfare-to-work services, are being
conducted not directly by government entities but by private, often large,
for-profit corporate entities. 8 Although contracting had always played
some role in the provision of welfare-to-work services, the entrance of
large, for-profit corporations, the scale of contracting out in some
jurisdictions, and the focus on performance-based contracting, has
significantly altered this landscape.
The move to privatization arose in large part from two significant
shifts in federal law. In 1996, the federal government invited states to use
private entities to provide services and to use virtually any means at their
disposal to lower the welfare rolls. These changes created an ideal
environment for a large growth in the role of private entities. The PRA
included a provision allowing states and localities to contract out eligibility
determinations, 9 creating a new and potentially tremendously lucrative
Redefining The Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy In The Era of
Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1307 (2001). For an interesting discussion of the
effects of privatization on the delivery of welfare services, see MARY BRYNA SANGER,
THE WELFARE MARKETPLACE: PRIVATIZATION AND WELFARE REFORM (2003).
8
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-245, WELFARE REFORM: INTERIM
REPORT ON POTENTIAL WAYS TO STRENGTHEN FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF STATE AND
LOCAL CONTRACTING 3 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02245.pdf
[hereinafter GAO, WELFARE REFORM]. In 2005, forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia did some contracting of welfare-to-work services at the state or local level.
SONDRA YOUDELMAN WITH PAUL GETSOS, COMMUNITY VOICES HEARD, THE
REVOLVING DOOR: RESEARCH FINDINGS ON NYC’S EMPLOYMENT SERVICES AND
PLACEMENT SYSTEM AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS IN MOVING PEOPLE FROM WELFARE TO
WORK 21
(2005),
http://cvh.mayfirst.org/files/The%20Revolving%20Door%20%20Full%20Report.pdf [hearinafter THE REVOLVING DOOR].
9
42 U.S.C. §604(a)(1)(A) & (B) (1996) (“A State may . . . administer and provide
services under the [TANF program] . . . through contracts with charitable, religious, or
private organizations; and . . . provide beneficiaries of assistance under the [TANF]
programs . . . with certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement which are
redeemable with such organizations.”). As a practical matter, the PRA’s allowance of the
contracting out of eligibility determinations was limited, to a certain extent, by the
federal government’s refusal to allow the contracting out of eligibility determinations for
food stamps and Medicaid. For example, in 1997, the Clinton administration denied a
request from Texas to contract out its TANF program on the grounds “that it would

8
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market for the for-profit sector. 10 Second, and equally significant, the
statute moved power for setting welfare policy from the federal
government to states and localities, a trend generally referred to as
“devolution.”
The PRA envisioned widespread state and local
experimentation and, in many ways, paralleled the incentive-based
contracts that would emerge in the welfare-to-work arena. States were
given a fixed sum of money, the sum they received under the AFDC
program in 1995, few mandates, 11 and enormous motivation for lowering
their welfare caseloads by any means they saw fit. 12 The message from
the federal government to the states was crystal clear: if you manage to
cut the welfare rolls, you will be rewarded financially, and, to a far
greater degree than under the AFDC program, we will not hold you
accountable for the means by which you achieved this goal. 13 These twin
empower private sector employees to determine eligibility for Medicaid and Food Stamps.”
Kennedy, supra note 4, at 231 n.4 (citing White House Limits States in Privatizing Welfare,
WALL ST. J., May 5, 1997, at A20).
10
See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Giant Companies Entering Race to Run State Welfare
Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, at 1; Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare
Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 89–90 (2003). For
a more extensive discussion of the role of privatization in the PRWORA and in particular
the move to inclusion of for-profit entities in the provision of welfare programs, see
Kennedy, supra note 4, at 256.
11
The welfare law was touted as promoting devolution and, to a certain extent, it did
leave states room to experiment, but this was only in the context of significant constraints
on the states’ ability to provide assistance with federal TANF dollars. For example,
states were barred from providing TANF-funded benefits to many lawful immigrants,
were not permitted to provide federally funded benefits for more than five years, and
were constrained in a variety of ways from providing these benefits to teenage parents
and to parents who failed to comply with work and child support requirements. 42.
U.S.C.A. § 609.
12
Principle among the changes embodied in federal welfare reform was the concept
of “devolution”—a devolving of authority for programmatic design from the federal
government to the states. This principle is embodied in 42 U.S.C. §601 (1997), which
describes the purpose of the program as “increas[ing] the flexibility of States in operating
a program designed to” meet the purposes of the statute and which eliminates any
individual entitlement to receive benefits under the program. Id.
13
Although there is no question that the PRA called for devolution of power on a
much larger scale than earlier welfare programs, Joel Handler argued persuasively that
throughout the twentieth century the United States has consistently delegated
administration of social welfare programs to lower levels of government when the

9
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invitations, to use private entities to provide services and to use virtually
any means at their disposal to lower the rolls created an ideal environment
for a large growth in the role of private entities. 14
And grow it did. The most recent national survey, released in 2002 by
the United States General Accounting Office reported that, in 2001, 49
states and the District of Columbia used contracts with private entities to
provide some welfare services. Nationwide spending in 2001 exceeded
$1.5 billion, which represented at least 13% of total federal TANF and
state maintenance-of-effort expenditures, excluding expenditures for cash
assistance. 15 And not only did the general use of private entities grow, but
subjects of the program socially categorized as “undeserving.” HANDLER, supra note 5,
at 49.
When there is agreement on the deservingness of the category, the
program is federally administered and fairly routine. On the other
hand, when welfare is controversial, and when controversies boil up
and demand upper-level attention . . . the preferred response, from
the perspective of the legislature, is to try to escape political costs by
granting symbolic victories and delegating the controversy back down
to the local level.

Id.

14

For a discussion of the interlinking roles of privatization, devolution and
reinvention of government in an array of social service contexts see Jody Freeman, The
Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 155, 160-64 (2000).
15
GAO, WELFARE REFORM, supra note 8, at 8. Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families, or TANF is the name of the federal program created by the 1996 Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRA”). Under the terms of
the PRA, in order to draw down federal TANF funds, states were required to spend on
TANF or TANF-like programs, 75% (or in some circumstances 80%) as much as they
contributed toward federal welfare assistance – the Aid to Dependent Children program –
in 1994. This is referred to as the “Maintenance of Effort” (“MOE”) requirements. 45
C.F.R. §263.1 (1999). Thus, the GAO’s use of the combined TANF and MOE dollars
to calculate the scale of privatization accurately reflects the minimum amount states were
spending on privatized welfare services in 2001. In addition, because some states
actually regularly spend more on TANF and TANF-related goals than they need to in
order to meet the federal MOE requirement, the GAO estimate is probably low. See,
e.g., E-mail from Trudi Renwick, Senior Economist, Fiscal Policy Institute to Wendy A.
Bach, Instructor, City University of New York School of Law (Nov. 16, 2007, 09:59
EST) (on file with author) (citing data provided to Ms. Renwick from the New York
State Division of the Budget showing that New York State MOE spending exceeded
required MOE spending in federal fiscal years from 2001–2006 in sums ranging from

10
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the use of for-profit entities grew exponentially. By 2001, 13% of the
$1.5 billion given to private entities to operate TANF and TANF-related
programs went to for-profit entities. 16
B. New York City: Welfare Reform and the Move Toward Privatization
Welfare reform of the kind envisioned by the PRA began in earnest in
New York City prior to passage of the federal law. In 1995, then-Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani and then-Human Resources Commissioner Jason Turner
created the work experience program (“WEP”) and mandated participation
for 35 hours per week in that program as a condition of eligibility for
public assistance. 17 Along with WEP, they changed the “culture” of
welfare offices by establishing Eligibility Verification Review, a system
designed to root out “welfare fraud” by creating administrative hurdles to
eligibility and by converting Income Support Center to “Job Centers.” In
the words of then-Commissioner Jason Turner, welfare reform was
designed to create “a crisis in welfare recipients’ lives, precipitating such
dire prospects as hunger and homelessness. . . .” 18
The move to privatization in New York City came a few years later.
In 1999, the Giuliani administration put out for bid $500 million in
contracts to provide welfare-to-work services for public assistance
recipients. 19 Privatization of welfare-to-work services proceeded and
expanded over the next several years with contracts to provide
employment assessments, services for individuals who allege physical and
$51 to $703 million per year).
16
GAO, WELFARE REFORM, supra note 8, at 8. An in-depth discussion of the
significance of the entrance of the for-profit sector in welfare services is outside the scope
of this Article. For an interesting discussion of this topic, see SANGER, supra note 7, at
72–97.
17
NEW YORK CITY BAR, COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REPORT, WELFARE
REFORM
IN
NEW
YORK
CITY:
THE
MEASURE
OF
SUCCESS
3,
http://www.abcny.org/Publications/reports/show_html.php?rid=41 [hereinafter WELFARE
REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY] (Nov. 1998)(last visited March 7, 2008).
18
Id. at 23 (citing Commissioner Jason Turner, Address at the Nelson A. Rockefeller
Institute of Government (Nov. 1998)).
19
Id. at 10.
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mental impairments that interfere with their ability to work, and a variety
of other services. 20 The contracts were generally performance-based,
paying contractors only when they met performance goals for a particular
client.
i. The Advocacy Community Responds to Welfare Reform
Central among the advocacy community’s strategies to combat welfare
reform were the filing of class actions law suits to stop or slow the
implementation of key welfare reform initiatives and a series of lobbying
efforts to blunt the harshest effects of reform. 21 The litigation successfully
slowed implementation of welfare reform, ensuring some adherence to
both due process and substantive rights in the implementation of reform.
Similarly, lobbying efforts resulted in the preservation of some protections
that had been assured under AFDC. Nevertheless, welfare reform,
evaluated solely on the basis of whether welfare rolls plummeted, was
significantly more successful. Between 1995 and 2006, the welfare rolls
in New York City plummeted an astounding 65 percent. 22 If parallel
economic improvements by former welfare recipients accompanied those
role reductions, advocates could have concurred with the administration
20

This growth in welfare contracting was part of an expansion of human services
See, e.g., SUSAN
contracting overall during this period in New York City.
BUTTENWIESER, CITY PROJECT BULLETIN, FOCUS ON CONTRACTING (Dec. 2000)
http://www.cityproject.org/publications/contracting/2000-12-31.html (last visited March
7, 2008) (stating that in 2000 human services contracting was over $4.2 billion or 11% of
New York City’s budget).
21
WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 17. Among these litigation
efforts were Reynolds v. Guiliani, which challenged the conversation of welfare centers
from Income Support Centers to “Job Centers” on the ground that the agency was
“preventing peoplepl from applying for Medicaid, food stamps, cash assistance and
emergency assistance in violation of fedral and state statutory and constitutional law” Id
For an in depth look at the litigation efforts of the advocacy community from 1996
forward, see http://www.nclej.org/courts-case-dev.php (last visited September 19, 2008).
22
Sewell Chan, Welfare Rolls Falling Again, Amid Worries About Poverty, N.Y.
TIMES, April 6, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/06/nyregion/06welfare.html. As
of April 16, 2007, New York City's welfare dropped to a historic low of 368,444, a total
decline of nearly 68% since 1995. Press Release, Office of Temporary and Disability
Assistance, New York State Welfare Rolls Continue To Decline (April 16, 2007),
http://www.dads.ny.gov/main/news/2007/2007-04-16.asp).
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that welfare reform was a success. But, as was the case nationwide, 23 this
did not occur. The social safety net was largely dismantled and families
remained steeped in deep poverty and ever more vulnerable to the vagaries
of the low wage labor market.
In addition, in a trend paralleled nationwide, New York City saw the
founding and growth of a number of grassroots organizing groups that
took on various welfare reform issues. Chief among these were Families
United for Racial and Economic Equality, founded in 2000 by a group of
women on welfare to improve welfare recipients’ access to education; 24
the Welfare Rights Initiative, founded in 1997 by a group of women on
welfare attending the City University of New York who work to “inject
the voices of students (especially those with first hand experience of
poverty) into . . . welfare reform debates” 25 and Community Voices
Heard, “an organization of low-income people, predominantly women on
welfare, working to build power in New York City to improve the lives of
our families and communities . . . through a multi-pronged strategy,
including public education, grass roots organizing, and leadership
development . . . .” 26 These groups employed a variety of organizing
and advocacy strategies to bring attention to and combat welfare reform.
These organizing tactics were, in many cases, quite effective in bringing
pressure to bear on the local administration around some of the worst
aspects of welfare reform and in adding to national efforts to combat
welfare reform. 27
WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 17 at 13-14 (discussing the rise
in hunger and homelessness that occurred in New York City). See also Juliet M. Brodie
Post-Welfare Lawyering: Clinical Legal Education and a New Poverty Law Agenda, 20
WASH. U. J.L & POL’Y 201, 216 (2006)(discussing the often worsening economic
circumstances of former welfare recipients in the work force due to increased expenses
associated with work).
24
See FUREE’s homepage, http://www.furee.org (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
25
See Welfare Rights Initiative, Mission Statement, http://www.wri-ny.org (last
visited Feb. 25, 2008); see also Stephen Loffredo, Poverty Law and Community Activism:
Notes From a Law School Clinic, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (2001).
26
Community Voices Heard, http://www.cvhaction.org (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
27
Some of the most visible New York City organizing work from this time was
documented in A Days Work, A Day’s Pay, a documentary produced by Mint Leaf
Productions which:
23
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ii. The Advocacy Community Responds to Privatization Directly
While the traditional litigation and lobbying advocacy efforts affected
privatization only indirectly, other advocacy efforts aimed directly at
privatization itself. Chief among early efforts to combat privatization was
a campaign to target ethical breaches in the city’s first wide-scale
contracting efforts.
In 1999, the Giuliani administration sought to let $500 million in
private entities contracts to provide welfare-to-work services. 28 Almost
immediately, the administration’s contractual bidding process embroiled
the administration in a scandal. The City Comptroller Alan Hevesi
investigated allegations that the administration violated fair bidding rules
by engaging in “wide-ranging discussions on its ‘welfare reform efforts’”
with officials at Maximus Inc., the eventual recipients of the largest share
of the contracts, five months prior to its first informational meeting with
other prospective bidders. 29 The comptroller engaged in a protracted but
ultimately unsuccessful effort to stop the letting of the Maximus contract. 30
In addition, in 2004 and 2005, Community Voices Heard (“CVH”)
follows three welfare recipients in New York City from 1997 to 2000
as they participate in the largest welfare-to-work program in the nation.
When forced to work at city jobs for well below the prevailing wage
and deprived of the chance to go to school, these individuals decide to
fight back, demanding programs that will actually help them move off
of welfare and into jobs. It was broadcast nationwide on PBS and cable
throughout 2002 and 2003.
http://www.mintleafproductions.com/adw.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (citing A DAY’S
WORK, A DAY’S PAY (Mint Leaf Productions 2002)). Another highly visible and effective
national campaign, the Welfare Made a Difference campaign, was launched by the
Community Food Resource Network. “The mission of the . . . campaign [was] to
document the experiences of parents who have received welfare and collect their
recommendations for improving the system.” CAITLIN JOHNSON, CONNECT FOR KIDS,
WHEN WELFARE WORKS, http://www.connectforkids.org/node/222.
28
WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 17 at 10.
29
Nina Bernstein, Company Had Head Start Preparing Bid in Welfare-to-Work
Program, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at B6.
30
Id.
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began to research the effectiveness of welfare-to-work contracts. The
report the group issued is one of the few pieces of qualitative research
documenting the problematic experience of welfare recipients in privatized
service environments. 31 The report provides essential data on how
privatization is harming poor communities, augments and legitimates an
organizing campaign to improve welfare policy, and offers an effective
model of advocacy to address the harms of privatization. As described
more fully in Section Four, CVH’s work and methodology can be
incorporated into public law mechanisms to create accountability in the
contracting process.
iii. Privatization Outcomes:
From Welfare to Work

A Program That Failed to Move People

CVH’s report documented the extraordinary overall failure of New
York City’s first large-scale privatization effort. In the report, entitled
“The Revolving Door: Research Findings on NYC’s Employment

Services and Placement System and Its Effectiveness in Moving People
from Welfare to Work” (hereinafter “The Revolving Door”), CVH

studied the effectiveness of contracts between the City of New York and
private vendors to provide welfare-to-work services. 32 The researchers
took New York City at its word that the main goal of the program was to
But see Frank Munger, Dependency by Law: Poverty, Identity, and Welfare
Privatization, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 391 (2006). Relying on extensive focus
31

group interviews with welfare recipients and other actors in the social welfare system in
Buffalo, New York, Professor Munger provides a fascinating account of the effects of
privatization and other aspects of welfare reform on the self perception of women
receiving welfare.
32
THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8. The program under study in THE REVOLVING
DOOR was New York City’s Employment Services and Placement (ESP) program. This
program was designed to serve approximately 27,000 clients per year from the city at a cost
of approximately $43,000,000 per year. Individuals participated for 35 hours per week for
a maximum of six months. Id. at 29. For the first two weeks of the program, they spent all
their time with the private vendor, engaging in assessment, job readiness and job search
activities. After two weeks they spent two full days a week at the vendor’s site and three
days a week working in a work experience placement at another site. Id. The goal of the
program, according to city documents, was to “assist all non-exempt” applicants and
participants to achieve self-reliance through paid employment. Id. at 1.
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move people from welfare to work and, “set out to uncover whether or
not currently operating job readiness and job placement programs
accomplish their intended goals, what stands in their way, and how they
might be improved to better serve the needs of the clients, the providers,
and the system at large.” 33 With very few exceptions, CVH revealed a
system that was almost completely failing to meet its stated goals.
The contracts were entirely performance-based, meaning that vendors
were paid only when a client reached a particular outcome. 34 At the start
of the contracts, the city projected that, of the individuals who enrolled in
the program, 46% would be placed, 35% would retain jobs for three
months, and 25% would retain them for six months.
The actual
outcomes, however, were far less impressive. Of the average of 4,144
people who were referred into the system each month, only eight percent,
or 346, were placed in employment, and of those 43% (149 individuals)
still had their jobs at three months, and 35% (121 individuals) had their
jobs after six months 35 The program referred clients to jobs that offered
Id. at 27. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the program, CVH analyzed
documents from the city agency obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests,
performed a random survey of 600 clients, interviewed staff from all but one of the
vendors, and conducted twelve in depth client interviews. Id. at 17-18.
34
Id. The total reliance on performance based incentives in these contracts made
them unusual. In 2001, only 20 percent of all TANF contracts were incentive-based in
any way. Id. at 27 (citing SAGNER, supra note 7, at 20). The privatized vendors were
representative of the wide range of private entities in the field. Included were large,
multi-national and national corporations such as Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. and
America Works, fairly large non-profits such as Federation Employment Guidance
Service, Inc., Goodwill Industries, and Wildcat Service Corporation, and New York City
based non-profit entities such as the Non-Profit Assistance Corporation. Id. at 28, 33.
The organizations used a wide variety of programs and tactics to provide services but
were all operating under the same incentive-based contract terms. Vendors received 25%
percent of the maximum per client payment at job placement, 45% if the person retained
the job after three months and the remainder if the person retained the job for six months.
The vendor could also receive some bonus payments for placement in “high wage” jobs
or jobs that led to a closure of the welfare case.
35
Id. at 31. Interestingly, after the report was released, the major dispute between
CVH and the city agency had to do with how placement and retention figures should be
calculated. CVH insisted that the system as a whole be held accountable not only for
those who enroll but for those who are referred. Thus CVH’s calculation leaves all
referred individuals in the denominator, thus reducing the percentages of “success.”
33
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low salaries, little stability and very little chance of leading the families
out of poverty. Seventy-five percent of those with ESP vendor-referred
jobs earned $8.00 per hour or less; 19% were referred to part-time
positions, and many of the full-time positions were temporary. 36
Moreover, of those placed in jobs who earned enough to close their
welfare cases, 29% returned to public assistance within six months and
36% remained unaccounted for. 37
Given the low placement and retention figures, CVH focused
significant portions of the report on documenting what happened to the
92% of the population who were not placed and the structures that led to
these breakdowns. The program punished, through a reduction of already
meager benefits, 38 a disturbingly high number of individuals for some
failure to comply with rules. Of all those referred each month, 76% of
the population (on average 3,149 people) fell into this category, either
because they did not attend the program at the start (30% of the full
CVH’s position was, rightly, that, given that the city advertised the program as one
designed to assist clients, if clients choose not to participate in a program that too is a
sign of failure on the program’s part. However, even if one accepts the city’s position
and calculates the numbers counting only those who enrolled in the program, the statistics
don’t improve significantly: only an average of 15% of those who enroll are placed in
jobs by the end of six months in contrast to the 25% projected by the city. In addition,
this calculation dispute does not effect CVH’s findings as to the nature of the jobs held by
those who actually obtained employment. Id.at 33.
36
Id. at 35.
37
Id. at 39.
38
Under New York State Law, when an individual fails or refuses without good cause
to comply with work program requirements, their pro rata share of the budget is reduced
for some period of time. N.Y. SOC. SERV. § 342 (1997). The length of sanction varies
based on the number of previous sanctions in the household’s record and the composition
of the family. Id. For example, for a household with a mother and two children who “fails
to comply” a second time, her regular grant of $691 is reduced by one third for a minimum
of three months. At any one time an average of approximately 25% of the overall caseload
is either in the pipeline to be sanctioned or is actually sanctioned. For the current work
participation status of the New York City caseload, see City of New York, Department of
Social Services, Human Resources Administration, Weekly Caseload Engagement Status
(Jan. 2008), http://www.nyc.gov/html/hra/downloads/pdf/citywide.pdf (last visited Feb. 23,
2008). This document regularly provides data on the proportion of the caseload in various
statuses including those in the sanction process or with a sanction in effect.
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population) or because the agency concluded that they had failed to
comply with some program rule later in the process (46% of the full
population). 39
This dramatic contrast between the 121 people in jobs after six months
and the over 3,000 people punished monthly in the system, represented, in
CVH’s estimation, an utterly failed system. Despite these clear failures,
when the city redesigned and rebid the contracts in 2006, the contract
incentives were modified only slightly, 40 and the same vendors that had
run the ESP program received new contracts. 41
These two pieces of data: first that the overwhelming majority of
recipients ended up sanctioned instead of in employment and second that,
despite this failure, the contracts were relet to the same vendors on similar
terms, suggests something quite disturbing. As noted above, welfare
reform has been deemed a success in large part because of the radical
reductions in caseload.
However those reductions have not been
accompanied by similar advancement of welfare recipients in the labor
market. The ESP program, although promoted as one designed to move
people into the labor force, appears significantly more successful at
39

The complete outcome data was as follows: 8% placed; 30% sanctioned for
failure to appear; 14% sent back to the agency because of an inappropriate referral, 46%
sanctioned for failure to comply with a program rule and 2% were still active in the
program. Id. at 30.
40
The payment milestones under the Back to Work Program were as follows:
Contractors could be paid a maximum of $5,000 per participant. Ten percent is paid
upon completion of an assessment and employment plan (a new aspect of the contracts);
30% is paid upon placement in unsubsidized employment for thirty days at a minimum of
20 hours per week; 10% is paid is the placement is of a “time limited” or sanctioned
individual; 2% is paid if the placement results in a case closure; 25% is paid for retention
at 180 days and an additional 3% is paid if the individual shows a 10% wage gain from
initial placement. The contracts also provide additional incentive payments for vendors
that increase the rate of sanction case removal, increase positive administrative indicators
and increase the federal work participation rate. See Contract Between the City of New
York and America Works of New York (on file with author).
41
COMMUNITY VOICES HEARD, HRA BACK TO WORK SUPPORT AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
INITIATIVE:
TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE/TRAINING,
MONITORING/ASSESSMENT,
AND
EVALUATION
(2007),
http://www.cvhaction.org/node/160#attachments.
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punishment than at placement. Given the agency’s apparent endorsement
of these outcomes through the reletting of contracts to the same vendors, it
is fair to speculate that these devastating outcomes were endorsed by the
agency letting the contract. 42 For the purposes of this article, the question
becomes how these outcomes were effectuated.
iv. Privatization Incentives: The Motivating Forces Behind Failure
CVH’s report not only documented the failures of the ESP system but
identified the systemic problems that led to these outcomes. It’s criticisms
were wide ranging. CVH noted problems that predicted failure, including
the lack of experienced job developers and inadequate curriculum for job
skills training. For the purposes of this article, however, the most
interesting critiques focused on how both the formal contract terms and the
formal and informal contract performance monitoring failed to create
meaningful employment. In particular, the report criticized the lack of
access to education and training and the contractual disincentives to
providing services to clients whose path to work would be challenging.
Despite a legal entitlement to having one’s preference for education or
training honored under many circumstances 43 and a desire, by 71% of the
clients, to attend education or training, 44 CVH found that one in three
clients did not know that education and training might satisfy a portion of
their work requirements 45 and only 18% ESP participants attended
programs. 46 CVH reported that the structure of the contract payment
42

In addition, although the specific reasons for the reletting of the contracts was not
clear, it is likely that the agency was subject, to a certain degree, to capture by the
agencies that held the ESP contracts, meaning that even if real competition existed at the
beginning of the ESP program by the time the new requests for proposals was issued,
there were very few other vendors who were able to credibly bid for the contracts. This
phenomena and its possible impact here provide support for arguments that privatization
through contracting is problematic because it strips the government of the ability to
control programs over time. See infra n. 78.
43
N.Y. SOC. SERV. § 335 (1997).
44
THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8, at 64.
45
Id. at 53
46
Id.
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system led to a failure to provide education and training. Quite simply,
the contracts created no real incentive to place people in education and
training as vendors, paid only for placement and retention, focused their
efforts on placement as the most likely strategy to improve their rates. 47
These performance incentives led the vendors to “cream,” selecting out
and serving those who were easier to serve and avoiding serving those
who had greater needs: 48
Many providers felt frustrated that the fully performance-based
structure of the contracts, defining performance solely in reference
to the final outcome of job placement and not the steps necessary to
reach that outcome, put them in a bind. They did, at times, need to
focus on the individuals that were most likely to be placed quickly,
and overlook those that needed more support to reach that stage.
Such a financial assessment forced vendors from time to time to
Id. at 70. Although the contractual focus on retention would seem to push vendors
to give participants access to education and training to promote hiring into more stable
employment, this apparently did not occur. Instead, given the difficulty in meeting the
retention goals, vendors reported to CVH that they focused efforts on upping their
numbers of initial placements as a way to ensure a steady cash flow. Id.
48
Although the CVH study is one of the few to document the creaming phenomena,
it has long been the fear of critics of using performance-based contracts in the welfare
area. See, e.g., LaDonna Pavetti, Michelle K. Derr, Jacquelyn Anderson, Carole
Trippe, & Sidnee Paschall, Changing the Culture of the Welfare Office: The Role of
Intermediaries in Linking TANF Recipients with Jobs, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. ECON.
POL’Y REV., Sept. 2001, at 68. For an extensive discussion of these and other phenomena
in the contracting out of welfare services, see SANGER, supra note 7, at 16–21. In addition
to the clear contract incentives to serve only those easiest to serve, there are greater
institutional pressures on employment agencies to avoid serving those who are hardest to
serve. As Joel Handler has aptly observed:
State employment services compete with private services in presenting
themselves as reliable sources of qualified labor to private employers.
Sadly, it is not in their interests to devote a great deal of resources to
those welfare recipients who could benefit the most from work
experience and training. . . . The strategy will be to satisfy the
minimum funding requirements and somehow deflect the hard cases.
Difficult clients (that is, clients with lots of problems) will somehow
be excused or dropped from programs instead of receiving extra help
and encouragement.
HANDLER, supra note 5, at 28.
47
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compromise their ethics . . . . Vendors that would normally want to
prioritize education and training for clients . . . are forced to
merely focus on job placement for cash flow purposes. 49
Equally disturbing were the incentives created by the contract to divert
those who were harder to serve by finding a means to punish them for
non-compliance instead of serving them. CVH reported that the vendors
were “discouraged from working with clients for the length of time often
necessary to address barriers and are instead encouraged to sanction
them.” 50 Furthermore, “[t]he incentives are structured in a way that
encourages vendors to work with those easiest to place quickly, and leave
behind those that need more support and more time to achieve initial
placement. Clients realize this and grow wary of a system that is failing
to meet their needs.” 51
Not only did the performance incentives, on their face, discourage
vendors from working with those clients requiring additional services, but
vendors reported that, in the informal monitoring processes, they were
regularly encouraged by the city agency to sanction clients. “Vendors
[were] quick to explain that they are discouraged from working with
clients for the long amount of time often necessary to address barriers and
are instead encouraged to sanction them.” 52 In the words of one vendor
49

THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8, at 70.

Id. at 8.
51
Id.
50

52

Id. at 89. This encouragement to sanction clients in New York City’s privatized
system was paralleled by a perhaps more explicit action in Wisconsin, a jurisdiction famed
for being at the forefront of welfare reform. According to Lawrence Mead, a strong
supporter of welfare reform and privatization, at one point during the implementation of
welfare-to-work contracts in Milwaukee, the private vendors were, in the eyes of state
administrators, exempting too many clients from work requirements and were therefore
putting into jeopardy the ability of the state to meet federally mandated participation rates.
Worried about this threat to federal funding, a high-ranking Wisconsin
administrator ordered the contractors to sanction more recipients for
nonwork. Thus, unrelated to any change in recipient behavior, the rate
of sanctioning rose from single-digit percentages to more than 30
percent in a matter of weeks, knocking many nonworking recipients off
the rolls and restoring the participant rate.
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addressing the failures of the ESP system:
Why continue to send [people to the same] program if it’s not
working? … HRA tells us to [sanction them for failing to comply]
. . . but why? They are just sent to another ESP Site. We’re
known for keeping people on our roster for too long. But, if we
[sanction] everyone, we wouldn’t have anyone. The whole system
is a recycling process.” 53
At this point several things should be clear. First, from an outcome
perspective, privatization failed to move people from welfare to work and
the vast majority of clients ended up punished instead of helped. Second,
the city’s renewal of contracts with the same vendors and with only minor
modifications of the contract terms appeared to endorse these outcomes. 54
Third, from an administrative law perspective, the motivating force
governing the interaction between the welfare recipient and the “welfare
worker” had radically shifted. In a traditional administrative law setting,
the behavior of the government-employed welfare worker is motivated, at
least in theory, by the mandates contained in law, regulation and subregulatory materials.
CVH’s report provides support for the hypothesis that the vendor’s
behavior is governed in large part by contract terms and not primarily by
the substantive statute or regulation governing the welfare program. Even
Munger, supra note 30, at 399–400 (citing LAWRENCE M. MEAD, GOVERNMENT MATTERS:
WELFARE REFORM IN WISCONSIN 146 (2004)).
53
The Revolving Door, supra n. 8 at 7.
54
In many ways the data CVH uncovered was not surprising when viewed in a
national context. Researchers have long observed that performance-based contracts in the
welfare arena would create incentives to reduce services and push recipients off of the
welfare rolls. For example, in probably the most celebrated use of private contractors in
welfare reform, contractors in the W-2 program in Wisconsin were permitted to keep a
portion of unspent contract funds, and, in certain circumstances, were permitted to keep
benefits that they withheld from recipients as a result of case sanctions, thus creating
enormous incentives to withhold benefits and services. Karyn Rotker, Jane Ahlstrom &
Fran Berstein, Wisconsin Works—for Private Contractors, That Is, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 530, 533 (2002). For a more in depth discussion of the way that corporations are
given incentives to maximize profits through denying or reducing benefits and services,
see Kennedy, supra note 4, at 301–03.
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beyond this, the performance under the contract is motivated not only by
those formal contract incentives but by informal monitoring mechanisms.
When the city agency pushed vendors to sanction clients instead of giving
them services, this dynamic became clear.
Although CVH was able, through fairly extraordinary efforts, 55 to
uncover this data and write a detailed and critical report, the contract
terms and contract monitoring structures that led to these outcomes were
created with little or no public scrutiny. 56
Privatization, at least in this context, was thus an extraordinarily
effective mechanism to design and implement, without any public input or
initial scrutiny, a program that would impose highly punitive welfare
policies. This lack of public input is precisely the problem that this article
seeks to address.
The central question, then, is whether either
administrative law or the market currently offers an effective mechanism
for public participation in this new form of administrative governance or
whether new administrative law structures must be designed to respond
more effectively to this lack of transparency and accountability. Section
Two turns to the first of these questions.

II. The Feasibility of Relying On Traditional Accountability Structures Or
the Market To Address The Problems of Privatization
Traditional administrative law offers a variety of tools designed to
ensure that when the government formulates policies, it is accountable to
55

CVH relied both on its own capacity to collect data and, to some extent, on the
initial naiveté of the administration. When CVH sought to reproduce its methodology in a
subsequent report, it encountered substantially more resistance and ultimately did not
prevail in getting anywhere near the robust data that it did for the ESP report. ALEXA
KASDAN WITH SONDRA YOUDELMAN, FAILURE TO COMPLY: THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION IN HRA’S WECARE PROGRAM 10 (2005),
http://www.cvhaction.org/english/reports/FailureToComply.pdf [hereinafter FAILURE TO
COMPLY].
56
The contracts were let through traditional public contracting procedures, a process
that leaves virtually no room for public input into the substantive terms of the contract. See
infra Section Two.
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the public and adheres to fundamental democratic norms. 57 Chief among
these structures are freedom of information and sunshine laws, laws
requiring the government to provide notice of administrative rulemaking
and an opportunity for the public to comment prior to final promulgation
of rules, and mechanisms for members of the public to sue if an
administrative agency acts outside the boundaries of its statutory mandate.
Each of these bodies of law creates opportunities for democratic
participation in a privatized context. However, the fact of participation by
the private entity significantly complicates the analysis and renders
exclusive reliance on these structures as they are currently constituted
difficult if not impossible. 58 In addition, public law also offers a variety
of mechanisms designed to ensure the fairness of government contracting
processes. Chief among these are regulations governing procurement
processes. 59 Finally, inherent in the move toward privatization is a
suggestion that the market itself will stand in the place of regulatory
structures to create good policy. In the following section I briefly review
the feasibility of using both sets of administrative law structures as well as
the market itself to increase accountability. In Section Four I will argue
that a substantial reworking of elements of all these structures that takes
into account both the realities of public contracting and the power
differentials inherent in provision of social welfare services offers some
potential to increase the accountability of this system.

See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R VERKUIL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 23–40 (2004).
57

58

For additional discussions of the erosion of traditional administrative law norms
raised by the contracting of government functions to public entities and the critiques
leveled at privatization as a result of that erosion, see Jody Freeman, Extending Public
Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1301–11 (2003); Freeman,
supra note 14, at 176. For an even more general discussion of public law concerns
raised by various forms of privatization, see Minow, supra note 3.
59
Natalie Gomez-Velez, Proactive Procurement: Using New York City’s Procurement
Rules to Foster Positive Human Services Policies and Serve Public Goals, 9 N.Y. CITY. L.
REV. 331, 352-53 (2006).
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A. The Feasibility of Relying on Traditional Administrative Law
Mechanisms Designed to Create Accountability in Administrative
Rulemaking and Operations
As a conceptual matter, freedom of information, sunshine, and notice
and comment laws are predicated on a traditional conception of
administrative law: the administrative agency, which is the creation of
and is governed by statutory enabling legislation, creates and implements
rules that govern its interactions with the public. To check what would
otherwise be inappropriate power, the agency is subject to a variety of
mechanisms designed to render more democratic the conduct of the
agency. 60 Meetings of the government body are, in theory, subject to
sunshine laws, allowing the public to view the formal workings of this
process. 61 Freedom of information laws allow the public to obtain some
access to documents produced by the government, again subjecting the
agency to public scrutiny and therefore enhancing democratic
Notice and comment laws provide an informal
accountability. 62
rulemaking process in which members of the public participate in the
promulgation of regulations that govern the way the agency interacts with
the public. 63 Finally, actions predicated on claims that an administrative
agency exceeded its statutory mandates confine the ability of the
government agency to wholly circumvent the democratic checks inherent
in the passage of laws by publicly elected legislative bodies. 64
As an initial matter, each of these tools presumes that a government
agency is the primary actor. If the government is not the actor, it is far
from clear whether any of these laws apply, leaving some doubt as to the
efficacy of a litigation strategy for addressing the concerns I raise in this
article. For example, the relevant provisions of The Administrative
60

For a general discussion of the statutory and judicial checks on administrative
actions, see PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL supra note 57 at 79-226.
61
Id. at 497-98.
62
Id. at 431-73.
63
Id. at 327-43.
64
Id. at 364-408.
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Procedure Act, the Freedom of Information Act and the Government in
the Sunshine Act apply, with some exceptions not relevant to this
discussion, to “agencies” defined as “each authority of the Government of
the United States . . . .” 65
Thus, on an initial look it appears, for
example, that documents produced by an entity under contract with the
government to provide welfare services may not be available under
freedom of information laws. 66 Under the same doctrine, sunshine laws
may not allow one to view meetings being held by entities under contract
with the government.
Beyond the problems raised by the applicability of the relevant
administrative law tools to a restrictive conception of what is a
“government agency” or what is “state action,” 67 however, is a
fundamental distinction in administrative law, between quasi-legislative
functions of administrative agencies on the one hand and all other
functions on the other. 68 Administrative law accountability tools of the
65

Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C § 551(1) (1994). For a detailed discussion
of the significance of this restriction see Alfred Aman, Proposals for Reforming the
Administrative Procedure Act 6 IND J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD, 397, 415-16 (1999).
66
For example, although CVH was able to procure data given by the vendors to the
administrative agency through the state Freedom of Information Law, it is not at all clear
under New York Law that they could have gotten any data directly from the vendors. See
e.g. Farms First v. Saratoga Economic Development Corp., 635 N.Y.S.2d 720 (App. Div.
3d 1995)(Non-for-profit corporation not subjected to Freedom of Information Law even
though it received over 50% of its revenues from the county, where it simply contracted
with county on a fee-for service basis); Ervin v. Southern Tier Economic Development,
Inc., 809 N.Y.S.2d 268, 270 (3d Dep't 2006) (non-profit development corporation not an
agency where board was comprised of private individuals, no control by municipality of
corporation, audits of financial records are private and not public record, did not hold itself
out as an agent of the municipality, and did not disburse funds on behalf of municipality);
but cf Buffalo News, Inc. v. Buffalo Enterprise Development Corp., 619 N.Y.S.2d 695,
697 (N.Y.,1994) (non-profit local development corporation considered an "agency" for
FOIL purposes where it was created exclusively by and for municipality, required to
publicly disclose its annual budget, held itself out as an "agent" of municipality, channeled
public funds into the community, board members were public officials, held offices in
public buildings, and enjoyed many attributes of public entities).
67
For a particularly compelling reconceptualization of state action doctrine, see
Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for An Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1169 (1995).
68
See Pierce, Shapiro & Verkuil, supra note, 57, at 282 (describing informal

26

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1287743

Please do not cite without permission of the author.
WELFARE REFORM, PRIVATIZATION AND POWER:
RECONFIGURING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STRUCTURES FROM
THE GROUND UP, FORTHCOMING 74 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
(NOVEMBER 2008).
kind I have been discussing arise, fundamentally, from a concern that the
administrative state functions without the checks and balances inherent in
the other branches of government.
The fear, embodied in some
conceptions of this branch of administrative law, is that the administrative
state is in effect an unelected legislative body, able to impose its will on
the public without any form of accountability. As a result, when an
administrative agency acts more like a legislature, for example
promulgating a welfare regulation governing employment rules or
eligibility standards, it is acting in its quasi-legislative function. 69 Laws
such as notice and comment and procedural mechanisms allowing parties
to litigate against the agency if it promulgates a rule in excess of its
statutory authority are applicable to those processes precisely because, in
theory, these processes, if unchecked, lack sufficient limitations on the
power of the administrative agency. But when the government is not
acting in a “quasi legislative” function, these protections do not exist.
In the context of trying to create accountability in a privatized sector of
government programs, this matters because government contracting is
traditionally placed on the non-legislative category. A prime example is
the exclusion of government contracting from the notice and comment
provision of the Administrative Procedure Act. 70 The theory behind this
and similar exclusions is that when the government is procuring services,
for example, to build a road, it is acting more like any other actor in the
marketplace and less like a legislature. This may make sense when
applied to building a road or entering into a contract to procure office
supplies for a government agency, but it makes significantly less sense
rulemaking as creating procedures that “closely resemble the process of enacting
legislation . . . . [The agency] can act through . . . issuing a notice of its intent to act,
providing an opportunity for individuals and groups to comment in writing on its
proposed action, and accompanying its final action with a statement of basis and purpose.
Functionally, informal rulemaking is well-suited to quasi-legislative tasks – establishing
rules applicable to groups of people.”).
69
As a general matter under the Administrative Procedure Act, “[a]ny rule that has a
significant, binding effect on the substantive rights of parties will be characterized as a
legislative rule” and will be subject to the rule-making procedures in the APA. Id. at
322.
70
5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2004).
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when the government is procuring human services. 71
Returning now to the description above of how the formal contract
terms and the informal contract mechanisms were the primary force
motivating the interactions between the private vendors in New York City
and welfare recipients, and the likely applicability of these findings to a
wide variety of privatized contexts, it is clear that contracts themselves, as
well as informal contract monitoring functions, should be moved over
from non-quasi legislative function into a quasi legislative function, thus
subjecting them to traditional administrative law mechanisms. 72 So at
least one potential “solution” to the problem described above is subjecting
contracts to notice and comment. However, as Alfred Aman has noted,
and as the CVH study indicates, because informal contract monitoring
mechanisms play such a significant role in actual contractor behavior,
merely subjecting contracts themselves to notice and comment will not
fully address the problem. As Aman discusses it,
Even if the details [of the contract] are noticed, its day-to-day
implementation may not be visible to the public. . . . [S]uch an
approach assumes a distinction between administration and
policymaking that does not exist in reality. The process of
administration inevitably involves policymaking, especially when
emergencies or unusual circumstances arise. Thus, noticing the
full details of a proposed contract with a private provider should be
a minimum requirement of the privatizing process, but these
contracts themselves may need to be subject to frequent review. 73
Therefore, there is a case to be made that tools such as freedom of
information and sunshine laws, notice and comment requirements, and the
state action doctrine, must be expanded to include the conduct of private
entities.
These strategies offer potential avenues for increasing
accountability and must be pursued by scholars and advocates in the field.
However, as argued in Section Three, without taking into account both the
Gomez-Velez, supra note 59.
Aman, supra note 65, at 417.
73
Id. at 417.
71
72
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radically changed nature of governance in many sectors and issues of
disproportionate power, strategies such as these may ultimately fail to
significantly enhance accountability on their own. 74
Another body of public law that provides some possibilities for public
participation is the law governing public procurement processes.
However this body of law focuses almost exclusively, “on ensuring low
price, fairness to vendors and the avoidance of corruption.” 75 Procurement
mechanisms, traditionally designed for contexts involving the delivery of
tangible good and services, “. . . may be too limited to address the much
more substantial issues that arise when government contracts out social
services and traditionally governmental functions.” 76
Nevertheless, as
Professor Natalie Gomez-Velez has pointed out, and as the wide-scale use
of contracting in traditional government-run programs suggests,
examination and alteration of procurement policies to, “improve the
quality of human services provided though contracts” can lead to
improved procurement policies. 77 In Section Four of this article, I suggest
ways that administrative law concepts can be imported into the
procurement process to meet these ends.
B. The Feasibility of Relying on the Market.
Proponents of privatization posit the market itself as the means to
74
For additional discussion of the problems with importing wholesale and without
modification traditional public law mechanisms to a private context, see e.g., id. at 417;
see also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
574–93 (2000).
75
Gomez-Velez, supra note 59, at 332.
76
Freeman, supra note 14, at 165.
77
In an extensive study of procurement reforms in New York City, Gomez-Velez
suggests that, in incorporating more mechanisms to address the substance and quality of
contracts for human services, procurement policies are changing to accommodate values
associated with the quality of government services. Gomez-Velez, supra note 59. GomezVelez posits this change as part of what Jody Freeman has termed “publicization,” the
incorporation of public law values into formerly private settings as a means of ensuring
continued adherence to Constitutional and public law values in the face of privatization.
Freeman, supra note 58. This term also aptly describes the project of this Article.
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creating effective welfare programs. The above subsections examined
traditional administrative law tools with an eye to whether they
successfully created accountability to poor communities in a contracted-out
welfare setting. The same question applies here: does the market itself,
absent any public law intervention, offer a structure of accountability to
the poor clients of the welfare system? Will competition inherent in
market-based structures lead to increased innovation and efficiency and
ultimately to programs that are “better” in the eyes of those served by the
programs?
In a market model, a hypothetical consumer chooses one product over
another, drawing resources to the better product and leading to the
improved outcomes and efficiencies that the market model promises.
Here, given the structure of welfare programs, it is faulty to assume that
that consumer role is played by the welfare applicant or recipient.
Welfare recipients do not choose the program to which they are assigned.
Instead, in New York City, as is the case in many jurisdictions, they are
assigned by the agency on a random basis. As it is certainly not the
welfare recipient who is making choices in the market, resources are not
drawn to one vendor or another based on the preferences of the
“customer.” When one conceives of the consumer not as the welfare
recipient but instead as the government, who is measuring performance
based on milestones they have set, the model makes a bit more sense. 78
78

This Article assumes, based on CVH’s data, as well as on a long history of social
welfare policy being used as a tool of subordination, discussed in Section Three, that the
government is likely, if not subject to substantial outside pressure, to create policies that
do not advance the needs of poor communities. The literature on market efficiencies
does not largely share this assumption. Although a full discussion of market failures in
the more traditional senses is beyond the scope of this Article, there are at least two
fundamental market failures that can lead to inefficiencies. First, for a variety of
reasons, it is difficult to maintain sufficient competition for contracts to lead to optimal
market results. What tends to happen, instead, is that even if a significant number of
entities initially compete for a particular contract, over time vendors tend to become
established as the providers for a particular program. For a discussion of an egregious
example of the way in which competition can be eliminated in a privatized welfare context,
see Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare State, supra note 4 at 261-62
(describing the attempted buy out, by Citibank EBT Services of Transactive, thus
threatening to give Citibank monopoly control over electronic benefits transfer systems in
thirty three states). At the same time, because government has turned over the running of
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But from the perspective of accountability to poor communities, the ESP
program data clearly indicates that the government does not stand in the
shoes of program clients in choosing where to direct resources. In the ESP
program, 92% of the population was not placed and 76% were punished. 79
Despite these dismal outcomes, the contracts were renewed with very few
changes. Had welfare recipients done the choosing, it is difficult to
imagine that the program would have received such an endorsement. In
fact, if one allows CVH to speak for the community, it is quite clear that
welfare recipients considered the program a failure and would have
reconfigured it much more substantially.
This accountability failure is not surprising. As Martha Minow aptly
observes “[w]ith social services, including welfare-to-work transition
assistance . . . accountability becomes especially important but also
recalcitrant, because those most directly affected by the services or failures
to provide services are politically and economically ineffectual. Treatment
of vulnerable populations simply does not work well in markets that depend
upon consumer rationality or upon political processes that demand active
citizen monitoring.” 80
the program to a private entity, the capacity of the government to run the program
without the vendor decreases. As a result of these parallel trends, the vendors begin to
have monopoly control over the program and the government begins to be captive to the
vendors. Under any analysis, this does not lead to efficient markets. For an extensive
discussion of these and other phenomena in the contracting out of welfare services see
SAGNER, supra note 7 at 16-21. In addition, government typically has difficulty building
sufficient expertise to monitor vendor performance. As M. Bryna Sagner has noted,
“[g]rowth in contracting must be accompanied by an equal growth in government’s
ability to manage and monitor contractor behavior, but there are indications that these
developments do not necessarily coincide.” Id. at 16. See also Freeman, supra note 14 at
171-72. So even assuming good intentions on the part of government actors, there are
substantial reasons to suspect the ability of the market to lead to “good” outcomes.
79
See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
80
The unsuitability of the market to create accountability in a setting such as the
contracting out of welfare has also been noted by Alfred Aman. See Alfred C. Aman Jr.,

Privatization and the Democracy Problem in Globalization: Making Markets More
Accountable Through Administrative Law, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1477, 1496 (2001)
(“Too often . . . the politics of privatization and the market populism that is often a
dominant part of the political rhetoric that comes into play make it seem as if the
privatization of prisons or the determination of welfare eligibility were similar to the
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Given the lack of an active consumer whose interests are aligned with
poor communities, it seems that the market offers fewer rather than more
opportunities to create accountability. Matthew Diller has persuasively
argued that while welfare’s move to privatization has been characterized
by its proponents as technocratic – seeking increased efficiency and
innovation - this explanation is insufficient and deceptive. Diller instead
views privatization as a means to obscure from public scrutiny the making
of welfare policy. 81 As he observes,
One of the consequences of the technocratic basis of privatization in
welfare is that critical policy decisions are made in obscure ways.
The actual content of programs is determined through contract
provisions governing performance measurement, governmental
oversight and financial incentive structures. All of these features are
generally hidden from public view by their sheer technical
complexity. To make matters worse, the process of drafting and
negotiating the critically important contractual terms is largely
closed to public input. 82
In New York City, the imposition of policies that harm rather than
help poor communities was being obscured through the use of
contracting. In fact, the ESP case study provides substantial evidence
to suggest that this is in fact precisely the role of privatization of this
program. In this instance, privatization created a situation where
extraordinarily punitive policies were imposed on welfare recipients

regulation of airlines or cable television. The transparency that comes with consumers or
customers voting with their feet, as it were, is not likely to materialize in the context of
such privatized governmental services without processes designed to provide the kind of
information that can empower citizens and make their participation meaningful.”).
81
Matthew Diller, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Public Power to Private
Actors: Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV.
1739, 1757 (2002).
82
Id. In some senses, privatization can be seen as taking even further, the process
by which power is granted to local government to administer welfare programs in a way
that entirely undermines any apparent positive benefit to the recipient. For an extensive
discussion of this phenomenon, before 1996, see HANDLER, supra note 5, at 42–49.
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through the use of contracting. 83 Ironically, it also suggests that the
turn to a market model, rather than functioning inefficiently as
suggested by many scholars, actually functions extraordinarily well in
rendering the poor of New York City tremendously vulnerable to the
vagaries of the low wage labor market and doing so without any real
accountability to either the public or the effected communities. 84

III. Creating Solutions: Conceptual Underpinnings
Given the wide scope of contracting out of traditional government
welfare functions and the effect of that transformation on the ability of
communities to create accountability in program design and
83

This data raises even more concerns when one looks at both outcome and service
provision data through the lens of race. Although CVH was not able to breakdown
outcome data by race, some national data suggests that both outcomes and the quality of
service provision vary along race lines. In Wisconsin in 1995-96, “61percent of the
white families receiving assistance left the caseload, compared to 36 percent of the
African-American families.” [CITE] In Illinois, leaver data from June 1997 to June 1999
revealed racial disparities in the reasons for case closure. [CITE] In that period a, “total
of 340,958 cases closed, of which 102,423 were whites and 238,535 were minorities.
[CITE] Fifty four percent of minority cases, but only 39 percent of white cases, closed
because the recipient failed to comply with program rules. [CITE] Though earned
income made 40% of white families ineligible for support, earned income made only
27% of minority families ineligible.” [Cite] In addition, various studies indicate better
treatment of white recipients than African American recipients in regard to positive
encouragement and assistance in job search and provision of supportive assistance such as
transportation help. Testimony of Steve Savner, Senior Staff Attorney, Center for Law
and Social Policy, House Committee on Ways and Means, April 3, 2001 at 4-7.
84
The disturbing “efficiency” of the market in imposing harsh penalties on poor
communities is not surprising. As noted by Michael B. Katz, this kind of “market
success” has been manifested in a variety of privatized programs. MICHAEL B. KATZ,
THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 31 (2001). As
he notes,
[t]he women forced to claim public assistance in order to survive
exert little if any influence over the design of newly ‘marketized’
welfare policies. The real exchange links politicians and their
constituencies. The commodity is votes, and the desired outcome is
reduced welfare rolls, regardless of what happens to those rejected for
benefits or terminated from assistance.
Id. at 31.
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implementation, new administrative law structures must be created to
advance these values. Section IV identifies practical accountability
structures that might serve these ends. This section details the conceptual
underpinnings for the creation of such administrative law structures.
These conceptual underpinnings rely on three bodies of scholarship: “new
governance” theory, social science literature documenting the historical
subordination in social welfare programs, and community/rebellious
lawyering scholarship. To create accountability in privatized programs
traditionally characterized by subordination, new governance structures
provide a politically promising means of reform. However, given the
disproportionate power between government and welfare recipient and the
long history of the use of social welfare programs to subordinate poor
communities, these governance structures must be significantly reconceptualized. Community participation must be transformed from mere
tokenism into substantive participation by poor communities. In addition,
the insights of community/rebellious lawyering scholarship argue for
making the source of that participation grassroots organizing groups.
A. The Administrative Law Framework Offered By New Governance
Scholarship
Although definitional frames and boundaries are hotly contested, 85 new
governance scholars seek to build a conceptual bridge between those
administrative law scholars that advocate the strengthening of New Dealbased centralized regulatory structures and those scholars from the law
and economics school that seek to rely on market forces to create
efficiency. 86 Seeking a third way between these two schools, scholars in
this field describe a new paradigm, “a key strength . . . [of which] is its
explicit suggestion that economic efficiency and democratic legitimacy can
be mutually reinforcing” 87 For the purposes of this article, this body of
See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, “New Governance” in Legal Thought
and in the World: Some Splitting as an Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 471, 473 (2004) (responding to Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L.
85

REV. 342 (2004)).
86
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 74.
87
Lobel supra note 85 at 344.
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scholarship is particularly compelling because it accepts the shift to market
structures and theory inherent in so much of current governance and
attempts to impose accountability in light of these shifts.
In seeking new administrative law paradigms, these scholars describe
movements away from both top-down regulation and “deregulation” in the
law and economics sense, and towards a collaborative, “softer” model
where a variety of stakeholders work together to create, implement, and
continually renegotiate programmatic structure and implementation. 88 This
scholarship engages directly with the newly configured modes of
governance of which privatization is a major component.
New governance frameworks put a premium on experimentation and
means of learning from experimentation. Fundamentally, they put far less
emphasis on centralized, expert decision-makers and,
“. . . [broaden] the decision-making playing field by
involving more actors in the various stages of the legal
process. It also diversifies the types of expertise and
experience that these new actors bring to the table.” 89
Among the key players included in this broadened set of governing actors
are third parties, non-government actors enlisted to administer public
functions, “. . . such as the delivery of social services. Sharing tasks and
responsibilities with the private sector creates more interdependence
between government and the market. In turn, increased participation leads
to fluid and permeable boundaries between private and public.” 90

See also Karkkainen, supra note 85 at 473 (describing new governance scholarship
as endeavoring to “simultaneously to chronicle, interpret, analyze, theorize, and advocate
a seismic reorientation in both public policymaking process and the tools employed in
policy implementation . . generally away from the familiar model of command-style,
fixed-rule regulation by administrative fiat, and toward a new model of collaborative,
multi-party, multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving New Governance.”).
89
Lobel supra note 85 at 373.
90
Id.
88
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New governance structures are also, ideally, characterized by increased
collaboration. Individuals participating in the governance scheme, “are
involved in the process of developing the norms of behavior and changing
them.” Individuals interact over time, share information and responsibility
and continually renegotiate and reconfigure program structures as their
collective understanding evolves. “In a cooperative regime, the role of
government changes from regulator and controller to facilitator, and law
becomes a shared problem-solving process rather than an ordering
activity.” 91
New governance frameworks also reject the centralization and
standardization characterized by New Deal structures and instead embrace
localization, competition, solutions derived from the particular needs and
circumstances of those closest to the problem, solutions that cross over
traditional boundaries between areas of law, and a kind of perpetual
experimentation inherent in multiple, ongoing collaborations. 92 Related to
collaboration is a concept of heterogeneity of approaches and continuous
improvement as a result of this ability of multiple, often private, actors to
approach problems from multiple perspectives. New governance structures
are envisioned as inherently dynamic and experimentalist in nature. 93
Finally a fundamental aspect of new governance frameworks is the
Orchestration requires that,
possibility of “orchestration.” 94
“decentralization must be coupled with regional and national commitment
to coordinate local efforts and communicate lessons in a comprehensive
manner.” 95 In theory, orchestration allows the government to identify a
problem in need of solving and then, “promote and standardize innovations
that began locally and privately. Scaling up, facilitating innovation,
standardizing good practices and researching and replicating success stories
from local or private levels are central goals of government.” 96 In a very
real sense, the power of the government in this conception is the power of
Id. at 377.
Id. at 379-86.
93
Id. at 396.
94
Lobel, supra note 85 at 400.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 400-01.
91
92
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the purse. 97 Government calls for and supports innovation, evaluates, and
then encourages both best practices and continued experimentation.
New governance frameworks offer a promising means of creating
accountability in contracted-out welfare programs for a variety of reasons.
First is the political feasibility of the project. As discussed in Section One,
privatization and large-scale collaborations between government and private
entities increasingly dominate welfare programs. Theories and strategies to
question, slow, and alter this process are an essential part of any
comprehensive advocacy strategy to respond to privatization. 98 However,
the dominance of privatization in the provision of previously governmentrun welfare programs and the current welfare program strategies require
engagement with the ideologies and practices of market-based, privatized
structures.
Second, in the midst of substantial data suggesting that privatization
failed in New York, although the data was sparse and merited further
research, CVH did find that some ESP vendors were slightly better for
program clients than others. 99 In this sense, the CVH report teaches that
experimentation can be of value and program design should, in the right
circumstances, encourage this innovation and learning. Any endorsement
of experimentation implicitly endorses a move away from specific,
judicially enforceable hard rules of conduct by welfare workers. Lawyers
who have spent their careers seeking to create and enforce detailed rules for
the conduct of welfare workers on the ground may find this suggestion, in
some senses, near heresy. 100 However, detailed, top-down rule making has
historically been beset by significant implementation challenges on the
Freeman, supra note 58 at 1285.
Several scholars have focused considerable attention on strategies and theories that
would slow privatization. See generally Freeman, supra note 74 at 574-93.
99
THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8 at 20. For example, vendor six month
retention figures varied from a low of 10% to a high of 20%, id. at 33-4, and while most
vendors reported that they could focus almost no resources and attention on services to
promote job retention, one vendor developed a program to enhance retention. Id. at 3334, 37.
97
98

100

As a lawyer and clinician who relies on and continues to enforce hard rules on
behalf of my individual clients, I offer these proposals with a deep understanding of this
hesitation.
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ground. 101 If the experimental, collaborative process envisioned by new
governance theory were structured to ensure significant participation by and
accountability to low income communities, then those structures may be
more effective than the top-down regulatory structures in creating positive
welfare policy. 102
101

See e.g. Minow, supra note 3 at 1242-43.

102

The degree and nature of the “softness” is hotly contested by a variety of new
governance scholars. See e.g. Karkkainen supra note 85 at 486-89. The concept of
“softness” refers, in part, to a move away from exclusive reliance on formal accountability
mechanisms such as sanctions for failure to comply with regulatory mandates, away from a
capacity to sue on the basis of agency disregard for its own rules and a move toward an
expansion of the means by which and the stages in which multiple actors can participate in
governance decision-making and the means by which the government can intervene to
control outcomes. Involved are a variety of inducements toward good behavior, such as
performance incentives. Lobel, supra note 85 at 390. In addition, new governance
concepts can include, “. . . variation in the communications of intention to control and
discipline deviance.” Id. at 391. A prime example of the new sanction regime is an
increased reliance on government support of multiple approaches to problem solving. “For
example, recently adopted performance-based regulation, designed to allow a range of
reasonable interpretations that can meet the legal requirement of comparable outcomes,
promotes flexibility in the means adopted to achieve the specified goals.” Id. Despite the
variability in possible outcomes permissible under these regulatory frameworks, many
scholars argue that the frameworks do involve government retention of significant coercive
power.
For example Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel’s vision of “democratic
experimentalism, a leading new governance concept,
contemplates mandatory participation in local problem-solving
experiments under the discipline of mandatory (but rolling) minimum
performance standards set and periodically revised by a central
coordinating body, coupled with a reserved coercive power on the part
of the center to intervene for purposes of forcing reconsideration and
reconfiguration of local experiments gone seriously awry.
Karkkanen, supra note 80, at 488 (citing Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998)). Despite
these arguments, however there is no question that allowing experimentation and diversity
of approaches and endorsing a move to incentive- rather than mandate-based regimes raises
a disturbing spectre for recipients of welfare programs. In short, without hard rules, it is
difficult to compel outcomes, and, as the CVH report makes abundantly clear, when a set
of rules focuses entirely on outcome, whether it be in a performance-based contract or a
performance-based regulation, the means of implementation are not subject to rules. This
is problematic for a variety of reasons. If there are no rules about the means used, it is far
more difficult for advocates to control interactions between the government (or private
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B. The Challenges To New
Disproportionate Power

Governance

Structures

Posed

By

New governance theory offers a politically feasible and potentially
promising framework for change. However, the accountability problem
inherent in the privatization of welfare programs, as revealed by CVH, is
that the government’s actual goals differed substantially from those of the
community. CVH sought programs that would help move people from
welfare into sustainable employment, and, arguably, the government
sought and endorsed a punishment and caseload reduction mechanism.
Looking at this program through the framework of new governance
theory, the governance process was deficient in a number of ways. Most
fundamentally, there were only two constituents who were party to the
creation of the program – the government and the vendors. On a very
basic level, if the structure offered by new governance scholarship is one
of broad-based, multi-constituent collaboration, then a fundamental flaw in
the means by which the ESP program was created was that the affected
constituency was not at the table. And the solution is, at a minimum, to
bring the clients into the collaborative governance structure. However,
this statement begs the far more complicated questions of how to bring a
party or community into a collaboration when (1) the parties to be
included (here welfare recipients) have substantially less political power
than anyone else at the table and, (2) even more disturbingly, when the
program at issue has historically been used to subordinate the clients it
purports to serve.
The effects of disproportionate power and subordination have been the
party acting on behalf of the government) and the person being served by the program.
Even given their failures, traditional accountability mechanisms create a clear means for
intervention that does produce some level of results. For example, even given the
structural problems in the implementation of the settlement discussed at the beginning of
this article, it did allow the mandating of hard rules and clear sanctions for systemic
noncompliance. Abandoning such tools, however limited, seems foolhardy. For this
reason, although this article advocates the investment of advocacy resources in the creation
of governance structures that augment community participation and input, its suggestions
should be critically evaluated in light of these risks.
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topic of some new governance scholarship. New governance structures are
least effective, in terms of holding true to the democratic participatory
values of administrative law, when key figures in a particular system do not
wield sufficient political power to participate in these collaborative
governance structures. As Orly Lobel frames it, “[a] central challenge for
the governance model is . . . to understand how collaborative environments
can be nurtured to produce equitable results, especially in settings where
vast power imbalances exist.” 103 Although there are valuable suggestions
in the literature as to how to begin to solve this problem, 104 and some
discussion of moments when true power was wielded by historically lesspowerful groups in a new governance framework, 105 the practical problem
of what governance structures might be put in place to address these issues
remains underdeveloped.
In a new governance environment, problems in terms of accountability
to any particular entity or interest group tend to arise when that entity or
group does not have the political power to affect process and outcome.
From the perspective of democratic accountability, when all relevant
entities or parties possess sufficient political power to participate in a
meaningful way in governance structures, accountability problems tend
not to arise. A few examples demonstrate this point.
In Down From Bureacracy, Joel Handler examines the consequences
of decentralization, deregulation and privatization for “citizen
empowerment.” He seeks to determine whether, given the shift towards
these new governance structures, “ordinary citizens – clients, patients,
teachers, students, parents, tenants, neighbors – have more or fewer
opportunities to exercise control over decisions that affect their lives.” 106
One prime example, discussed by Handler as one where democratic
accountability problems tend not to arise is the use, under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of the “voluntary protection
program.” This program is a system of self-regulation in which labor
103
104

Freeman, supra note 85 at 458-59.
See e.g. Lobel, supra note 3 at 216-27; Minow supra note 3 at 1266-70; infra note

122 and accompanying text.
105
HANDLER supra note 5 at 115-242.
106
Id. at 5.
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management committees are formed and work together to develop and
implement health and safety inspection standards and protocols. In
particular, Handler describes a study by Joseph Rees of the use of
voluntary regulatory structures in the California Cooperative Compliance
Program. In that program, joint labor management committees acted as a
surrogate for the OSHA inspector, and the role of the OSHA inspector
shifted from direct inspection to, in many circumstances, “problem
solving consultant.” 107 According to Rees’ study, this particular program
was tremendously successful in the sense that it resulted in far lower
accident rates than comparable sites. 108 Rees and Handler attribute this
success to a variety of factors, the most important of which, according to
Handler, was the consistent presence of strong unions at successful sites.
In short, strong unions ensured that labor participation was meaningful
and that the interests of the workers who would suffer accidents as a result
of health and safety hazards were consistently represented and accounted
for.
In contrast to the OSHA example where the affected constituency, the
workers, possessed sufficient political power to compel outcomes in their
favor, is the implementation of the Workforce Investment Act (“WIA”),
in Springfield, Massachusetts. In this example, the affected constituency,
potential clients of the workforce investment system, initially had little if
any role in policy creation and had to resort to an outsider, organizing
strategy to augment their political capital. WIA, in many ways a model
new governance structure, illustrates the continuing challenges for these
structures. The WIA-enabling legislation mandates the creation of local
workforce investment boards with broad membership, including client
membership, and policy setting authority. 109
107
108
109

HANDLER supra note 5 at 137.

Id. at 138.

The Workforce Investment Act (“WIA”) incorporates many new governance
concepts. The statute calls for the creation of state and local Workforce Development
Boards that must bring together a wide variety of stakeholders in state and local boards to
govern the provision of workforce development services. 29 U.S.C. § 2832(d)(5) (1998).
State and local boards include members from every major constituent and are responsible
for local oversight and administration. The local board negotiates performance measures
with the state and is held accountable for meeting those performance measures. 29

41

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1287743

Please do not cite without permission of the author.
WELFARE REFORM, PRIVATIZATION AND POWER:
RECONFIGURING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STRUCTURES FROM
THE GROUND UP, FORTHCOMING 74 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
(NOVEMBER 2008).
While WIA appears to function successfully in fostering increased
accountability in some localities, 110 the Anti-Displacement Project
(hereinafter the “A-DP”), an institutionally based membership
organization controlled by low-income people and located in Springfield,
Massachusetts, came to a very different conclusion about the
implementation of WIA policy in their jurisdiction. Strikingly, despite the
presence of new governance structures in the form of rolling performance
mandates and governance by state and local workforce investment boards
mandated to have community representation, in Springfield, clients of the
system appeared initially unable to meaningfully participate in setting local
U.S.C. § 2832(d)(5). Under WIA, program design is created through the participation of
this broad group of actors and jurisdictions function under performance mandates that
leave substantial room for experimentation. [CITE] WIA also incorporates some
accountability and transparency concepts from traditional administrative law. WIA
requires that proceedings of the Workforce Boards be open to the public and that certain
documents be available for public scrutiny and requires that plans be available for
comment prior to their approval. N In theory, WIA structures create opportunities for
community participation, thus creating accountability. Lobel, supra note 85 at 411.
110
Lobel cites, as a prime example of the effectiveness of WIA policy in a new
governance framework, the work of Project QUEST in San Antonio, Texas. Id. at 413–
16. Project QUEST has been cited as one of the most successful job training programs in
the country. Paul Osterman, Organizing the US Labor Market: National Problems,
Community Strategies, in GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN A NEW ECONOMY 289
(Jonathan Zeitlin & David Trubeck eds., 2003). It grew, beginning in 1991, from the
work of community activists in San Antonio who put at the center the experiences and
needs of low income members of its organizations. Id. at 254. These organizing groups
ultimately designed a program, Project QUEST, that provided long term training, modest
financial support of program participants during training, and direct linkages with jobs at
the conclusion of the program. Id. at 255. Project QUEST was not only tremendously
successful in its placement rate and the wage gains realized by participants, but it assisted
in reforming the community college system, altered the hiring patterns of employers and
augmented the larger organizing goals of the community organizing groups that
developed it. Id. at 256–57. The relationship between the development and success of
this program and WIA is not entirely clear. Although causation is difficult to identify, it
appears fair to speculate that Project QUEST’s success could have arisen, like that of the
union workers in the OSHA context, initially from the political power of the membership
organizations that led to the formation and ongoing support of the project. Once
developed and backed by the considerable political power of the organizing groups, the
governance structures of WIA clearly supplemented rather than hindered local support of
the program.
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WIA priorities. Nevertheless, the new governance structure that
characterizes WIA ultimately appeared to play some role in facilitating
significant accountability to the community.
In 2001, using a strategy strikingly similar to that utilized by CVH, the
A-DP set out to monitor implementation of WIA in their jurisdiction. 111
Strikingly, the data revealed by CVH and the A-DP were quite similar. 112
The A-DP research revealed a program that failed to provide access to the
education, training and other essential services sought by the clients. 113
Both programs failed to meet the clients’ self-articulated needs and
compromised the ability of poor people to succeed in the labor market. In
both programs, clients wanted to build skills that would enable them to
move towards economic sustainability, and in both cases, they were
almost uniformly denied these opportunities and diverted into the lowwage labor market.
The results revealed by CVH and the A-DP are, sadly, consistent with
the history of social welfare programs and policies. Although government
111

The A-DP created a leader-driven testing project to explore the training services
provided under the WIA. Over a two-month period, leaders went into the WIA
administered One-Stop Career Center and documented their experiences. The A-DP
identified 32 people who were either low-wage workers, unemployed, or welfare
recipients. The “testers” were a multi-racial, multi-ethnic team who had varying needs
and skill levels. The testers made a total of 42 visits to the Future Works One Stop
Career Center with specific requests such as “I want to get computer training” or “I’m
looking for a job in childcare.” Testers also documented language access as well as the
availability of services such as transportation and childcare assistance. After each visit,
the testers met with the testing coordinator and documented their overall experience,
what they asked for, and what they were told. ANTI-DISPLACEMENT PROJECT,
FUTUREWORKS: ROADBLOCKS TO SUCCESS, HOW FUTUREWORKS IS A DEAD END
STREET FOR LOW WAGE WORKERS (2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter
FUTUREWORKS].
112
It is, however, worth noting that the A-DP’s research methods were significantly
less rigorous than CVH’s, so limited conclusions can be drawn from it. Nevertheless, the
results are striking.
113
Everything testers asked for and documented was an eligible activity within the
Workforce Investment Act. None of the forty-two tests resulted in enrollment in a skill
development or training program. FUTUREWORKS supra note 111.
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actors have, often in response to pressure from a variety of fronts, 114
designed some programs that have advanced the interests of program
participants, social welfare policy over the course of American history has
been dominated by systems and programs that serve primarily to control
against political unrest and maintain a workforce that has little option but
to accept unstable, low-wage employment. 115 Social welfare policy is
quite often fairly characterized primarily as a means of labor market
control and a bulwark against social unrest rather than as a system to meet
the real needs of program participants. Social welfare policy is also
characterized by a long and shameful history of contributing to gender and
race subordination. 116
Welfare reform after 1996 only added to this long history. While
welfare rolls have plummeted, former welfare recipients have been pushed
off of welfare and into the low-wage labor market. They are off welfare,
but on the whole they have not moved towards any form of economic
security. Jobs into which former welfare recipients have been pushed fall
to women who suffer financially in comparison to their male colleagues in
the workplace and what few positive outcomes come from welfare reform
appear to fall disproportionately to white recipients. 117
When viewed through this historical lens, the results revealed by CVH
and the A-DP are not surprising. If in fact social welfare programs have
historically been and continue to be used to subordinate poor communities,
then one expects precisely these results: WIA would fail to provide
114

A review of the extensive victories of advocates and communities in fighting on
behalf of those in poverty is beyond the scope of this Article. For an interesting history of
the legal and organizing movements, see MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS
AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1960-1973 (1993); see also MIMI ABRAMOVITZ,
UNDER ATTACH, FIGHTING BACK: WOMEN AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES (2000).
115
See generally FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE
POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1993).
116
See, e.g., JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM
UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994); KENNETH J. NEUBECK & NOEL A.
CAZENAVE, WELFARE RACISM: PLAYING THE RACE CARD AGAINST AMERICA’S POOR
(2001); see generally LOST GROUND: WELFARE REFORM, POVERTY AND BEYOND (Randy
Albelda & Ann Withorn eds., 2002); WHOSE WELFARE (Gwedolyn Mink ed., 1999).
117
See supra note 83 and references cited therein.
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training that would render participants more expensive to employers and
New York City contractors would be rewarded for placing
disproportionately high numbers of recipients in highly unstable low-wage
jobs, would not be penalized for failing to provide program participants
with any marketable skills and would be rewarded for punishing the vast
majority of clients. The contracts CVH described, and the welfare reform
movement of which they are a key part, have the effect of giving
recipients little option but to subject themselves to the vagaries of the lowwage labor market. The difference between this privatized context and
earlier forms of policy creation and implementation is, then, not so much
the effect of policies but the specific structural contractual framework that
has made successful interventions by low-income communities even more
difficult.
Thus, in important senses, the programs that CVH and the A-DP faced
and mobilized against were strikingly similar. However, the results of the
A-DP’s work suggest that the new governance framework in WIA may
have provided more opportunities for the community group to intervene in
the governance structure in a way that increased accountability to program
clients. Using the results of this testing project to mobilize substantial
opposition to the WIA system in Springfield, the A-DP reached an
agreement with several key terms. The for-profit entity running the one
stop system was forced to transform into a “non-profit governed by a local
board of directors….” 118 The A-DP was granted a seat on the Regional
Employment Board. 119 In addition, the Regional Employment Board
agreed to, “set aside 50 percent of all federal WorkForce Investment Act
funds for job training and education for low-income adults, [ensure that]
all low-income job seekers receive training within 45 days of their initial
entry to FutureWorks, [create] a grievance process for career center
customers and [establish] a system to track wages and benefits in job
placements as well as success rates for training programs.” 120
Lori Stabile, Career Center Changes Focus: Now Non-Profit FutureWorks Meets
Demands of Community, THE REPUBLICAN, Dec. 9, 2001, at D2.
119
Lori Stabile, Jobs Group Marks Approval of Reforms, SPRINGFIELD UNION
118

NEWS, Nov. 1, 2001, at A11.
120
Stabile, supra note 118 at D2. Throughout the campaign, The Springfield Union
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Some of these successes appear to stem in part from the participatory
nature of the structures governing design and implementation of workforce
strategies under WIA. For example, the existence of the regional board as
a target of the A-DP’s activism, the award of a seat on that board to the
A-DP, and the emphasis on performance measurement are all closely
related to new governance theories of broad-based participation and
performance-driven policy.
In essence, by leveraging information
accessed not primarily as a result of the structure of WIA but instead as a
result of an organizing and research strategy, the A-DP raised their
political capital sufficiently to become members of the collaborative
governance structure and to effect significant change in WIA policy in
favor of their constituency.
The A-DP and CVH examples teach important lessons about how new
governance structures can be formulated to increase accountability. First,
the A-DP story offers a caution that the mere presence of broad
participation inherent in WIA’s enabling legislation or any other proposed
governance structure can be an empty shell if there is no mechanism for
substantive participation by the affected constituency. Second, one of the
key lessons of the story told by CVH and, by analogy told by the A-DP, is
that programs that purport to serve welfare recipients by assisting them in
moving from welfare to work, often actually function very differently,
rewarding contractors for punishing welfare recipients and placing the vast
majority of clients at the mercy of the low-wage labor market without any
enhancement of skills or marketability. In effect, the use of contracting
enabled the government to create and perpetuate a program that
subordinated rather than assisted its clients.
Thus, in addition to multiple opportunities for collaboration that new
News and other local papers provided extensive coverage of the campaign and its results.
E.g., Stephanie Barry, Angry Protests Invades Board Meeting, SPRINGFIELD UNION
NEWS, Mar. 22, 2001, at B4; Elizabeth Zuckerman, Career Center Focus of Debate,
SPRINGFIELD UNION NEWS, April 18, 2001, at B3; Maureen Turner, Activists Inflicted
the First Wound to a Local Job Center—Now the Political Sharks are Circling, THE
VALLEY ADVOCATE, May 24, 2001; Chris Hamel, FutureWorks Center Faces Shaky
Future, SPRINGFIELD UNION NEWS, June 3, 2001, at A13; Stephanie Barry, Changes in
the Works for Training Center, SPRINGFIELD UNION NEWS, June 6, 2001, at A1.
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governance structures offer, there must be mechanisms to counteract the
tendency of both government and private entities to perpetuate the
subordination of clients in these programs. In short, if one turns to the
collaborative, experimental frameworks offered by new governance
scholarship, one must ensure that, for programs characterized by
disproportionate power and a history of subordination, the seat at the table
reserved for program clients is a real seat.
Finally, a note on community organizing and lawyering. A central
task of the administrative law mechanism that this article seeks to describe
is the facilitation of substantive participation by welfare recipients and
other members of poor communities in the creation of welfare policy. In
this sense, this article joins a variety of scholars and activists who seek to
use lawyering and legal structures as a means to augment organizing
campaigns. 121
As argued above, given the history of subordination,
participation that rises above mere tokenism is difficult to achieve without
a significant alternation of the structures and mechanisms of participation.
However, even with a substantial reworking of structures of collaborative
modes of participation, if there is no person or group of people who have
the time, resources, and authenticity to speak on behalf of communities,
the project simply will not work. One viable answer to this problem,
which finds its roots in community lawyering principles, is to turn to
community-based grassroots organizing as the best hope for capturing and
amplifying the opinions, needs, and goals of poor communities as well as
exercising the power necessary to communicate and negotiate for these
121

An expansive discussion of law and organizing is outside the scope of this Article.
However, some particularly important texts in the law and organizing field include:
GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE
LAW PRACTICE (1992); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant
Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 407 (1995); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Diefontein on
Lawyering and Power, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 699 (1988); Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V.
Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 460–69
(2001); Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 1879 (2007). For an extraordinarily useful introduction to the literature of this
growing field, see Loretta Price & Melinda David, Seeds of Change: A Bibliographic
Introduction to Law and Organizing, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 615 (2001).
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needs. Thus, to the extent that that this article envisions structures that
will create a “real seat at the table” for effected communities, that seat
must be reserved for grassroots organizing groups.

IV. Community-Based, Research-Driven Participation As a Potential
Response
Section III recognized that, for a wide variety of reasons, new
governance structures provide a promising framework for creating
accountability in privatized social service programs only if these structures
create meaningful participation for those historically subordinated
beneficiaries of the programs. Drawing on the concepts of collaboration,
experimentation, and accountability at the root of new governance theory
and the lessons from the successful work of CVH and A-DP, this section
proposes the creation of social service contract monitoring bodies as a
means to render meaningful community participation in the governance
structure. 122
These bodies would broaden the participants in the
122

Augmenting new governance structures with community-based oversight
mechanisms has been suggested by some new governance scholars in much more limited
forms. For example, Jody Freeman, in her discussion of nursing homes in The
Contracting State suggests ways that contracts can be used to increase accountability and
has a lot of suggestions that are in line with mine. For instance, she suggests that
“contracts could be instruments for diversifying sources of oversight. For example, a
contract could establish an ombudsman to represent nursing home residents, or it could
demand that nursing homes submit to periodic review by a community oversight
committee.” Freeman, supra note 14 at 202. Similarly, she suggests, in discussing
Medicaid contracts (MCOs), that “[t]he contracts themselves could constitute crucial
accountability mechanisms, enabling state agencies to demand submission to independent
third-party oversight, private accreditation, and insurance requirements, among other
things. Contracts might thus serve as a means of enlisting additional nongovernmental
entities such as community groups and patient advocates to provide accountability.” Id. at
204 (citing examples in Massachusetts and Wisconsin that ensure community
participation in Medicaid contracting). Likewise, in discussing welfare-to-work contracts
and concluding that there is a significant lack of public accountability, Barbara Bezdek
proposes the creation of a “community congress to be held quarterly, to elicit the input of
TANF customers and affected communities, including locally operating employers, as a
source of guidance for the services offered by vendors.” Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual

Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished Democracy in Local Government
Contracts for Welfare-To-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559 (2001). Finally,
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formulation of policy and, essentially, would provide a structural means to
augment and build on the political power of community-based groups in
way that would significantly enhance their ability to participate in policy
creation.
The proposed monitoring body is a separate entity that provides
substantial oversight over all aspects of contracting for social services. It
ensures that contracting processes are transparent and that the voices and
priorities of potential recipients of the service under contract have the
resources and structural mechanisms to meaningfully influence contract
structures. 123
The monitoring body could be created by either the legislative branch of
local government or by publicly elected officials - comptrollers, public
advocates and the like - whose offices provide an oversight function. The
body could receive substantial structural support from private funding
sources concerned with the accountability and effectiveness of social
service contracts. The move to reliance on private entities to participate in
governance, discussed extensively above, lends credence to proposals for
the government to augment their capacity by using private groups to assist
in the funding and implementation of their oversight responsibilities. 124
The monitoring body could be a separately staffed organization or an
ongoing committee with organizational members, such as the local
workforce investment boards, mandated by the Workforce Investment
Board, where membership and function is mandated by statute as a
precondition to operation of the program. 125

in Public and Private Partnerships, Martha Minow points to contract law as a promising
place of intervention to increase accountability in a privatized social service environment.
Minow, supra note 3, at 1267, 1269.
123
The subject area covered by the monitoring body could be focused narrowly on
specific welfare programs, or have a broader scope of all human services contracts targeted
at poor communities.
124
Given the emphasis on good governance among current private funders, efforts
to fund these efforts through a combination of public and private sources may well be
successful.
125
See infra n. 109 and accompanying text.
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A. Specific Essential Elements 126
To function successfully, monitoring bodies must have four basic
characteristics:
1. Imposition of an altered notice and comment structure in the
procurement process;
2. Mandates to enable the monitoring body to design and implement an
ongoing research agenda;
3. Substantial participation by program recipients in all aspects of the
monitoring bodies’ work; and
4. A lack of conflict of interest between the monitoring body and any
potential bidders for government services.
i. Imposition of An Altered Notice and Comment Framework Into Public
Procurement Processes.
To advance the values of government transparency and public
accountability, as well as to create structures that lend additional political
strength to traditionally subordinated communities, procurement policies
must be amended to invite substantial input from both the public and the
monitoring body. This element is required because contract terms have
essentially taken the place of regulatory terms 127 and contracting, in the
welfare-to-work area, is a closed, non-transparent process with little if any
means for affected communities to participate in the process. 128 Thus, any
accountability structure must incorporate traditional public law concepts of
government transparency and opportunity for public participation into the
126

Before proceeding to a discussion of the specific elements of the proposal, it is
important to note that there is variation across jurisdictions on questions of political and
practical feasibility. In jurisdictions where local government has a history of receptivity to
advocacy and where organizing and advocacy resources are plentiful, advocates may be
successful in implementing very robust forms of these proposals, and in other jurisdictions
more political and practical compromises might be necessary. For that reason, each
subsection in this section describes why the element is essential, what it is designed to
accomplish and then both the ideal form of implementation of this element and some
political compromises that may still have the desired effect.
127
128

See infra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 58-77 and accompanying text.
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procurement process. The changes needed include: the publication of
proposed contract terms concerning performance measures prior to their
adoption, the imposition of a mandatory comment period during which the
monitoring body, along with the general public, will have an opportunity to
evaluate the proposed performance measures and issue recommendations,
and a requirement that the executive agency publish responses to comments
received both by the monitoring body and the general public. These
mechanisms would provide an opportunity for both members of the
community and the monitoring body to have access to terms and to
comment on them prior to their use in an executed contract.
ii. Mandates to Enable The Monitoring Body to Design And Implement
An Ongoing Research Agenda
Among the principles of new governance theory that are particularly
attractive in this context is the emphasis on experimentation, evaluation,
and the flexibility to redefine programs in response to successes and
failures. 129 As every good social science researcher knows, however, the
quality of any evaluation always depends on the quality of the questions
asked and the ability of the researcher to get real answers. The role of the
proposed monitoring body is, in large part, to provide ongoing evaluation of
programs that is driven by the self-articulated needs of program clients. In
order to effectuate this agenda, the body must be able to force government
actors and private entities to record and make publicly available data on
outcomes identified by the monitoring body, regardless of whether those
outcomes are included in the contract terms. In addition, the monitoring
body must have ongoing access to program participants as well as
government and private staff involved in designing and implementing the
program. 130
129

130

See infra note 89-97 and accompanying text.

Inclusion of these elements would result in research even more effective than the
research CVH was able to conduct. Although CVH managed to draw significant
conclusions from the available data, it was hampered by the lack of collection of certain
data points. For example, it depended heavily on its own survey for important data
points, such as knowledge about access to education and training and disparities in
outcome based on race, that would have been substantially more convincing had the data
come from the entire population. Similarly, the A-DP depended entirely on its own
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Like the element requiring substantial control by program participants
discussed in the next subsection, this research-focused proposal represents a
significant departure from traditional administrative law concepts as well as
from generally broadened participatory governance concepts. Like the
element of community control, this element addresses the problems of new
governance structures when dealing with traditionally subordinated
populations and the need to explicitly account for subordination in
designing contracting processes. A robust ability to force collection and
publication of data is essential in lending the political weight to a
monitoring body necessary to render substantive their participation in the
contracting process.
iii. Substantial Participation by Program Recipients in All Aspects of the
Monitoring Bodies’ Work.
As discussed extensively in Section Three, welfare programs have been
historically participated in the subordination of poor communities. As
argued in Section Two, any ability that communities and their advocates
had to render these programs accountable has been significantly eroded by
privatization. Although new governance structures are promising, they will
only be effective in creating programs that actually assist poor communities
if there is a mechanism in place to ensure that community participation is
meaningful. For all these reasons, perhaps the most important attribute of
any monitoring structure is ensuring that the body includes substantial
participation by welfare recipients and low-income communities in all
aspects of the body’s work.

sample data and thus issued results based on a very small data set. In addition, CVH’s
experience in a subsequent study lends credence to an argument that more robust data
access provisions are essential. In contrast to CVH’s experience in the research for The
Revolving Door, in researching the WeCARE program, CVH met with substantially
more resistance to provide data through the Freedom of Information Law, which
significantly impaired CVH’s ability to draw reliable conclusions. See infra note 55.
Clearly, had these organizations been able force data collection on points of interest to
them, they would have been able to monitor significantly more effectively and to be even
more productive in making policy change recommendations.
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iv. A Lack of Conflict of Interest Between the Monitoring Body and Any
Other Participants in the Contracting Process.
To adhere to transparency and public participation principles, the
composition or structure of the monitoring body must function
independently of both the executive branch letting the contracts and any
potential bidders for government contracts. The exclusion of these two
entities ensures a more open conversation about these contracts, moving
them from an essentially closed, non-transparent negotiation between the
administrative agency and bidders into a process in which affected
participants can participate meaningfully. 131
The importance of creating a monitoring body that is independent of
both the agency and the contractors was highlighted in a subsequent study
by CVH. After issuing The Revolving Door, CVH began a study of the
WeCare program, a program designed to assess and assign individuals with
physical and mental impairments. The contract design for that program,
unlike that of the ESP program, included mandatory monitoring by an
outside entity, and the agency in fact hired an outside entity to do this.
However, the entity in question had numerous contracts with the agency,
and CVH concluded that that the organization was not “entirely
independent of HRA and the reviews that [were] made available do not
provide adequate evaluations of WeCARE services.” 132
Ideally, the monitoring body would be compromised of organizations
that are, with the exception of any funding provided to serve on the
monitoring body, fiscally independent from government simply because this
would provide the maximum institutional independence.
In larger
jurisdictions with a robust non-profit sector, such an exclusion may be
feasible. In others, where there are fewer potential organizations available
to play a role, compromises may have to be made. 133 Still, to ensure
131

At this point, in the jurisdictions discussed above, contracting leaves no room for
participation by any other entities, much less impacted community members.
132
FAILURE TO COMPLY supra note 55 at 21.
133
Beyond the exclusion of the contractor and potential bidders, however, are other
more difficult issues concerning, primarily, the role of non-profit entities that are not
potential bidders but that do rely on government funds for their operation. The non-profit
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independence, the better choice is to exclude government-funded entities
entirely and rely solely on membership organizations and organizations
focused on research rather than include participation by organizations
whose ability to critically examine government programs would be
significantly compromised by funding concerns.
B. Political and Practical Feasibility
There is no question that there is a fundamental contradiction at the
heart of this proposal. On the one hand, the government’s historic and
current role in the creation and implementation of social welfare policy is so
fundamentally intertwined with subordination that relying on government to
create and monitor contracts for provision of social services will inevitably
lead to a continuation of this history of subordination. In light of this, there
is a certain irony in advocating for the creation of monitoring bodies by and
with the government. It seems that if this history is determinative, then in
some sense, the proposal is doomed either to be entirely politically
unfeasible to implement, or, if implemented, to be co-opted in a way that
fundamentally undermines its strength. My belief that this is, perhaps, not
entirely true comes from two observations. First, in a very real sense, the
technocratic efficiency justifications that are the public face of privatization
are also its Achilles heel. CVH‘s analysis of outcomes, when framed as a
matter of economic efficiency, bolsters less politically charged and highly
credible assertions that funds are being wasted and may provide motivation
for other branches of government or quasi-governmental bodies to step in to
play some role in improving outcomes. While that does not lead, per se, to
community-led monitoring, it does provide a less overtly political means for
communities to advocate that additional oversight is needed to improve
sector has historically played and to this day plays an enormously important role both in
the provision of social welfare services and in bringing attention to the needs of lowincome communities. At the same time, as the government turns more and more to the
private sector to perform functions previously performed by government agencies, the role
of the non-profit sector in this work has substantially increased and, in many circumstances
changed. As the government provides more and more of the funds supporting the nonprofit sector, the ability of these organizations to zealously advocate against government
policy is significantly compromised. Among the difficult questions a jurisdiction would
face in implementing these proposals is whether to exclude from membership in the
monitoring body entities that receive funding from the same branch of government letting
the contract but who do not intend to bid on the contract at issue.
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results.
The second reason for hope is the presence, in at least some
communities, of community-based, membership-led groups like CVH and
the A-DP. The creation of a monitoring body, even in a weaker form than
proposed here, has the potential to create a point of intervention and an
additional site through which these organizations can assert themselves and
engage in the politically contested questions of whose interests social
welfare programs should serve. And in turn, participation in such a body
could raise the institutional capacity of less strongly established
community-based groups that might lead to increased political power. The
A-DP story lends credence to that theory because the local Workforce
Investment Board, which, despite a facial requirement of community
participation, was originally not serving the needs of the intended recipients
of WIA services, did ultimately provide a point of intervention for the ADP. As a result of their report, the A-DP was able to advocate for the
restructuring of the local workforce development system in a way that made
it more responsive to community needs. Similarly, the monitoring body
could create points of intervention through which community organizations
could intervene to affect welfare policy.
CONCLUSION
In closing, I want to say just a few words about limited advocacy
resources. Having spent the better part of a decade working on welfare
issues in New York City, I am all too aware of the limited resources
available to advocate on behalf of welfare recipients, and the incredible
importance of continuing to enforce what few procedural and substantive
constitutional and statutory protections still apply. On the other hand, given
the scale of privatization and its broad applicability to the wide range of
programs traditionally run by the government, I urge that existing efforts to
confront privatization 134 be expanded and that others in the welfare
134

In the welfare area, in addition to the work of Community Voices Heard and the
Anti-Displacement Project highlighted in this Article, the National Center of Law and
Economic Justice works extensively on these issues. See National Center for Law and
Economic Justice, Privatization & Modernization, links to Advocacy and Resources,
http://www.nclej.org/key-issues-privatization.php (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
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advocacy community join forces with community-based organizations to
advocate for policies that respond directly to privatization.

56

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1287743

